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Development of National Cyber Security Strategies (NCSSs), and an 
Application of Perspective to the Colombian Case 
Abstract: 
States around the world face similar cyber-threats that have been addressed in official 
statements of policy such as National Cyber Security Strategies (NCSSs), towards diverse 
ends, depending on their capacities, characteristics, ideologies, purposes and/or vision. 
Generalisations have prevailed resulting in general frameworks and popular practical 
guidelines that were made to fit the situation of the issuers, commonly from the most 
developed countries, and departing from assumptions that are not applicable to all of the 
rest of states in the world. Governments began to realise the times marked a turning point 
for beginning to think about, and assert, the needs and possibilities of their own countries 
first, and for issuing more responsive and responsible laws and policies than they have 
ever had. At the same time, stakeholders recognise that cyber security is a transnational 
phenomenon that demands global efforts. A smart balance should be reached across levels 
and sectors to help increase the safe use of cyberspace and unfold its full potential. The 
general purpose of this work is to conduct conceptual and empirical research with a mixed 
methodology where the qualitative approach prevails, but also includes a short quantitative 
exploratory analysis. A comparative analysis of 5 NCSSs, document analysis, a 
questionnaire administered online and a case study were the methods that resulted in two 
theoretical contributions: A definition of cyber security, and the formulation of a set of 
working tools consisting of: the Adaptable and Transferable Guidelines. Both in order to 
establish the considerations required to complete a process of NCSS development; the 
suggestions on the Key Performance Indicators self-assessment list that affirms the 
benefits of measuring parameters; and, the format for essential components to be included 
in NCSSs. A case study on the Colombian policy formulation follows, and illustrates the 
applicability of these unbiased guidelines that could help the institutionalization of 
procedures and standards for more influential public policies and strategies. 
Keywords: 
Cyber Security, Strategy, Transferability, Adaptability, Guidelines. 
CERCS: P170, Computer Science, Numerical Analysis, Systems, Control. 
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Riiklike  Küberturvalisuse  Strateegiate (KTS) arendamine ja Kolumbia 
vaade 
Lühikokkuvõte: 
Üle maailma seisavad riigid silmitsi sarnaste küberohtudega, millele pööratakse 
tähelepanu ametlike poliitikadokumentide - küberturvalisuse strateegiate (KTS) - kaudu. 
KTSid koondavad eri tegevusi, võimekust, kirjeldusi, ideoloogiaid, eesmärke ja/või 
visioone. Valdavaks on üldistused, mille tulemuseks on üldraamistikud ja populaarsed 
praktilised suunised, mis on valmis tehtud, et sobida olukordadesse,  kus avaldaja neid 
kasutada saaks. Tihti on antud raamistikud ja suunised pärit enimarenenud riikidest ning 
tulenevad eeldustest, et need pole kohaldatavad ülejäänud riikidele. Valitsused on hakanud 
mõistma, et praegu on tegemist pöördepunktiga, kus esikohale tuleb seada siseriiklike 
vajaduste ja võimaluste loomine ja tõendamine, et seeläbi töötada välja seadused ning 
poliitikad, mis oleksid võrdluses eelnevatega paremas kooskõlas tegelikkusega ja 
vastutustundlikumad. Samal ajal tunnistavad sidusrühmad, et küberturvalisuse näol on 
tegemist riikideülese fenomeniga, mis nõuab ülemailmseid pingutusi.  Vaid nutika 
tasakaaluga erinevatel tasemetel ja sektoriteüleselt on võimalik kasvastada turvalise 
küberruumi kasutust ja tagada selle potentsiaali täielik rakendamine. Lõputöö 
üldeesmärgiks on läbi viia kontseptuaalne ja empiiriline uurimus, kus on kasutatud 
erinevaid metoodikaid. Valdavalt on kasutatud kvalitatiivset lähenemist, kuid lõputöö 
hõlmab ka lühikest kvantitatiivse uurimise analüüs. Lõputöö valmimisel kasutati 
järgnevaid meetodeid: võrdlev analüüs viie KTSi osas, dokumentide analüüs, 
veebiküsitlus ja juhtumikirjeldus. Nende meetodite kasutamise tulemusena formuleerusid 
töö kaks teoreetilist panust: küberturvalisuse termin ja tööriistakasti sisu. Tööriistakast 
koosneb suunistest, mis on kohandatavad  ja ülekantavad. See loob aluse kaalutlusteks, 
mis on nõutavad KTSi arendamiseks. Suunised hõlmavad soovitusi peamiste 
tulemusindikaatorite enesehindamise loeteluks, mis kinnitaks, et mõõdetavatest 
parameetritest tekib kasu. Samuti on loetletud kohustuslikud osad, mida KTS peaks endas 
sisaldama. Järgneb Kolumbia poliitikakujunduse juhtumikirjeldus, mis illustreerib 
erapooletute suuniste kohaldatavust. Antud suunised saaksid olla aluseks protsesside ja 
standardite ümberkujundamiseks. Selle tulemusena saaks luua mõjusamaid avalikke 
poliitikaid ja strateegiaid.  
Võtmesõnad: 
Küberturvalisus, Strateegia, Ülekantavus, Kohaldatavus, Suunised. 
CERCS: P170, Arvutiteadus, Arvutusmeetodid, Süsteemid, Juhtimine. 									
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1 Introduction	
The purpose of this work is to conduct rigorous conceptual and empirical research. It 
compares five existing (5) National Cyber Security Strategies (NCSSs), establishes 
guidelines with adaptable and transferable characteristics, and suggests Key Performance 
Indicators (KPIs) that governments could observe to develop a sound, durable NCSS, 
based on needs. The resulting set of tools indicates minimum considerations and state 
essential components, advocating for the institutionalization of an unbiased standard.  
This study used a mixed methodological approach mainly qualitative but also involving a 
short quantitative exploratory analysis. It conceptualises definitions, approaches and 
experts’ opinions; collected via an online questionnaire for proposing a new meaning and 
understanding of Cyber Security. It would be of particular help in the improvement of 
national and international agreements, which are considered vital to improve cyber 
security at global level. Additionally, the online questionnaire collects information about 
how the procedural development of NCSSs works in reality its obstacles and procedures. 
Other methods used for information and data gathering are: comparative interpretative 
analysis and extensive document analysis. 
Nowadays, digitalisation has profoundly affected the way in which society and 
organisations work, a functional society depends of a set of complex interconnected 
infrastructures such as energy, telecommunications, transportation and food [1], the 
majority of these are dependent on digital components. Besides, an increasing number of 
technological devices populate the world connecting people through optical fibbers, wires 
and airwaves handling vast amounts of digital information as part of the prevailing 
lifestyle of into the information age [2]. 
It can be said that everyday life depends on technologies and governments that must 
guarantee certain standards of safety and comfort, also to be aware of secure, effective and 
redundant performance of Critical Infrastructures (CI), digital services and 
communications. In addition, to protect the digital interests of their citizens, one of the 
measures that governments take is the development and implementation of public policies; 
these have to align all government organizations and entities, coordinate all stakeholders, 
and assign roles and responsibilities rationally [3]. 
Cyberspace allows for a diverse range of opportunities to communities and individuals: 
electronic communication, online education, e-government, access to global information, 
entertainment, etc. But in the same way it exposes people to new threats; “the more a 
society depends on ICT, the more it becomes vulnerable to cyber attacks” [4]. Societies 
are struggling against diverse sort of attacks that each day becomes more complex. The 
risk in the cyberspace is always present and new vulnerabilities are detected daily; safety 
cannot be fully guaranteed when an activity has a digital component.  
During the last decade millions of cyber attacks have occurred, an exact number is 
difficult to calculate because some are not officially disclosed or remain unnoticed by the 
victims; typologies change and states do not record all necessary statistics. Even when 
some of them should be considered to cause a high impact, such those targeting CIs or 
vital services may not be reported. Examples of high impact attacks are: in 2007 Estonian 
governmental websites were victims of a series of cyber attacks that were politically 
motivated or the well-known Stuxnet which changes the perception of what could be 
achieved through the cyber space until the point to be considered as the first cyber warfare 
weapon [5]. Furthermore, criminals use the cyberspace to do illegal activities taking 
advantage of the lack of boundaries and global instantaneous reach, the attribution 
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problems related, and the lack of cooperation among the states enables the criminals to be 
out of reach by law with low possibilities to be convicted or tried for their activities. 
Each country has a different set of priorities, aims, vision and interests invested in the 
cyber security area as a result of the needs, political will, budget, stakeholder’s 
involvement, particular risks and threats, and the country’s organisational structure. Those 
factors significantly influence the development of public policies that have to be tailored 
to the specific situation. The solution of one country could not generate a template and 
address the issues of another, even when they appear to share some characteristics.  
Societies are in states of constant change; so governmental strategies and policies should 
be adapted to suit new characteristics as well. States face the challenge of transforming 
towards new government systems, which must provide effective services, information and 
knowledge through a variety of technologies [6]. The governments as leaders in the 
development of National Cyber Security Strategies - NCSSs need proper and efficient 
solutions, which have to be applicable nationwide. 
Cyber security does not matter to states only; the safety of the domains does not only 
concern strategies, policies, procedures, guidelines or recommendations from the 
government point of view. The wellbeing and livelihood of the population is also at stake. 
Also no technical, operational or strategic magical solution exists, especially if focused 
only on one aspect or issued without input from all sectors affected. This work claims that 
the need to merge all stakeholders and call in several disciplines arise, coinciding with 
Chabinisky in that: “the cyber security challenge can only be addressed effectively by fully 
understanding the wide range of threat vectors” [7]. Cyber security so far has just been 
considered to belong to a technical domain, nested in computer sciences curricula when it 
regards to fundamental aspects of the social sciences, the humanities and other disciplinary 
fields. It is at the core of this research to attempt an interdisciplinary task of combining 
three study areas: Political Sciences, Strategic Management and Information Systems for 
the development of NCSSs, as Fig. 1 shows.  
	
Figure 1. Study Areas Applicable in the Development of NCSS. 
While universal solutions that can be applied by all governments are not pursued, a basic 
set of guidelines and indications on KPIs could be formulated to kept in check a 
systematic cyber security improvement at national level. 
Due to the importance of the NCSSs, the need for proper answers, and efficient solutions, 
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the development of National Cyber Strategies could be said to have become an 
investigation field. This research proposes a well-thought out and innovative approach of 
adaptable and transferable guidelines and KPIs, which policymakers could follow in order 
to improve the development of NCSSs. By adaptable means that may be modified 
according to differing or new factors, and by transferable that can be used for a variety of 
countries to their particular characteristics.  
To develop an effective and efficient NCSS is the aim of various states; frameworks and 
guidelines have been published by institutions as NATO, ENISA and OECD, which 
support stakeholders in the development process but they seems to be specifically geared 
to developed countries. Despite the guidelines, states do not seem to follow any structure 
and the development process is not publicly documented. They addressed their NCSS 
towards different ends depending on their particular realities, characteristics or vision. To 
the point that currently “there is no universally accepted explicit definition of what 
constitutes national cyber security” [8]. Even, the cyber security meaning differs 
depending on the sources approaches. At national levels states consider principally up 
down or a bottom-up approaches, although there are countries, which have not adhered to 
a formal definition [3].  
In order to apply the concept to a real situation, a case study is developed with the 
Republic of Colombia. The Colombian Government is aware of current and future cyber 
threats and the need to establish a unified national policy. It released in 2011 the Cyber 
Security Policy called CONPES-3701 with an implementation time of 5 years. 
Nevertheless, according to the Organizations of American States, the institutions created 
by the CONPES-3701 have not reached maturity; resources (financial, time and trained 
people are lacking) the stakeholder’s responsibilities determination is unclear; and, the 
identification, classification and prioritization of Critical Infrastructure (CI) are missing. In 
addition to the cyber security policy is out-dated [9]. 
To address the challenges raised by those recommendations, and to continue the 
improvement of the Cyber Security status of the country, the development of a new 
official Cyber Strategy is on the way. The process so far seems to lack methodological 
validity and would benefit from a more systematic process to improve the cyber security 
standing of the country.  Without a proper background review, the country could make 
misleading choices that would lead to further inefficiencies and eventually shortcomings. 
Unfortunately, it could also be the situation of many other countries that cannot find a 
cyber-security strategy that fits their common and yet basic characteristics. 
The research questions that arose to be address the research problem stated were: 
• RQ1: What are adaptable and transferable guidelines for developing National Cyber 
Security Strategies? 
• RQ2:  How to apply these theoretical perspectives to the Colombian case? 
 
This work is accomplished through the development of the following research tasks, for 
the first research question (RQ1): 
• To analyse the current understanding of cyber security; 
• To explore different perspectives on the formulation of NCSS; 
• To map/identify the different aspects that are linked to the problem (Infrastructure itself 
or secured infrastructure, The balance between National Security and data protection, 
Awareness or/and training and Cybercrime); 
• To determine (propose) key performance indicators considering the stakeholders, 
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principles and objectives, and vision via methodologies such as document analysis and 
an online questionnaire; 
• To establish what could be new transferable and adaptable components of the NCSS. 
 
To complete the work on the second research question (RQ2) the tasks are: 
• To investigate the current cyber security status and institutional needs in Colombia, 
taking a stock of the existing policies, regulations and capabilities; 
• To use the case study method to apply the developed guidelines to this concrete case. 
 
The thesis is divided into four chapters: the first constitutes the theory to support this 
research and presents the theoretical assumptions that the rest upholds. The second 
conceptualizes cyber security. The third, contains the NCSSs’ comparative analysis, 
proposes the guidelines, the KPIs and the minimum components of a NCSS. The last 
chapter the conceptual contributions are illustrated with an application to a case study that 
explores the cyber security situation of the Republic of Colombia. To end, the thesis 
presents its conclusions and limitations. 
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2 Background	
This chapter reviews the academic standing of the disciplines that are found to overlap in 
the development of NCSS, as well as the reported factors that policymakers frequently 
face during the development process. In addition, it discusses, the concept of cyber 
security and the importance of national strategies in the cyber security field, the guidelines 
and frameworks developed by researchers and international organizations for the 
development of NCSS. 
On one hand the information systems from Information Systems “is concerned with the 
interaction between social and technological issues” [10]. On the other hand, Strategy 
from Political Sciences described as the major programs of actions to reach the goals and 
objectives of the organization and the resource allocation used to relate the organization to 
its environment [11]. Finally, Strategy Management defined as a procedure to determine 
the relationship between the organisation and its environment through the use of selected 
objectives and resources allocation, which allow the development of efficient and effective 
action programs by the organisation [12]. This interdisciplinary integration allows the 
bringing about of all necessary support for developing a strategy in cyber security field, 
which nowadays is found to require more than technical solutions to enhance cyberspace’s 
safety. 
2.1 Cyber	Security	Definitions	
Cyber Security has been defined in various ways according to each country needs, 
perspective, knowledge and vision. The lack of a harmonised cyber security concept 
around states could cause problems when states need to coordinate, cooperate or 
collaborate, as they should at least depart from some common grounds. Even, some states 
avoid defining directly the concept itself, although they develop and implement a specific 
strategy in this area [3]. It is could be considered an issue when we are talking about 
protecting a domain, which oversteps conventional borders and demands coordination, 
cooperation and collaboration among the stakeholders. 
National and international organizations as well as researchers have also built definitions 
according to their needs, backgrounds their perspectives and aims. Some of them define 
cyber security with an emphasis on information security properties; confidentiality, 
availability and integrity such as ISO 27000 whereas others focus on combating the cyber 
threats. To illustrate its point the Table 1, compiles some examples. 
Table 1. Cyber Security Definitions. 
Source Document Definition 
Jamaica 
(Developing 
Country)  
National Cyber 
Security Strategy of 
Jamaica (2015). 
Policy Document. 
“The implementation of measures to protect 
ICT infrastructure including critical 
infrastructure from intrusion, unauthorized 
access and includes the adoption of policies, 
protocols and good practices to better 
govern the use of cyberspace.”[13] 
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The Netherlands 
(Developed 
country) 
National Cyber 
Security Strategy 2 - 
From Awareness to 
Capability of The 
Netherlands (2013). 
Policy Document. 
"Cyber security refers to efforts to prevent 
damage caused by disruptions to, 
breakdowns in or misuse of ICT and to 
repair damage if and when it has occurred” 
[14].  
Governmental 
Definition 
Australian 
Government- 
Attorney General’s 
Department. Doctrine. 
“Cyber security is one of Australia's 
national security priorities—Australia's 
national security, economic prosperity and 
social wellbeing rely on the availability, 
integrity and confidentiality of a range of 
information and communications 
technology.”[15]  
Academic 
Research 
Paper: Cyber security 
Policy as If Ordinary 
Citizens Mattered: 
The Case for Public 
Participation in Cyber 
Policy Making 
(2012). Doctrine. 
“The body of technologies, processes and 
practices designed to protect networks, 
computers, programs and data (and the 
critical infrastructures on which they rely) 
from attack, damage or unauthorized 
access.”[16] 
International 
Organizations 
The definition of 
cyber security by 
International 
Telecommunication 
Union (ITU)1. 
Doctrine. 
 “Cyber security is the collection of tools, 
policies, security concepts, security 
safeguards, guidelines, risk management 
approaches, actions, training, best 
practices, assurance and technologies that 
can be used to protect the cyber 
environment and organization and user’s 
assets”[17]. 
NCSS of 
Colombia 
CONPES-3701 of 
Colombia (2011)2. 
Policy Document. 
“The state’s capacity to minimize the level 
of exposure of its citizens to cyber threats or 
incidents.” [18] 
2.2 Factors	that	Influence	the	Development	of	NCSSs	
The particular characteristics of each country affect the development of public policies; 
the political will, stakeholder’s interests and economic priorities or available resources, are 
factors that determine the way states develop their policies.  
State defence in cyberspace is a current and widespread concern. Although some years ago 
cyberspace´s militarization was not considered an actual threat, some cases have 
demonstrated that it is not unlikely to occur. First, in 2007 the well-known Estonian’s case 
in which the country was victim of DDoS attacks and web defacements. Second, in the 
2008 Russia was accused of launching DDoS attacks against Georgian websites. A further 
                                                
1ITU is the United Nations specialized agency for information and communication technologies – ICTs. [Available at: 
http://www.itu.int/en/Pages/default.aspx, viewed on 01 May 2016]. 
2 CONPES: Consejo Nacional de Política Económica y Social (Spanish) - National Council on Economic and Social Policy [Available 
at: https://www.dnp.gov.co/CONPES/Paginas/conpes.aspx#googtrans/gl/en, viewed on 01 May 2016]. 
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instance is Stunext in 2010, which caused physical damage across international frontiers to 
an Iranian nuclear enrichment plant [19]. The previous instances as proof that the need for 
national defence in cyberspace is actual not theoretical as it was considered earlier. 
Public policy and the political will are vast topics and the latter is in constant change, 
linked to a multitude of factors that could describe the situation of each country.  The 
political effect over the NCSS is notorious given that at the end, governments classify and 
prioritize the resources and choose the international policies they want to support or 
follow. In this context, the government's role is one of initiative and leadership, to 
motivate stakeholders’ participation and to aim at a joint national vision in the 
development of its NCSS. Mummert & Mummert stated that “The ideal mixture of 
leadership and participation always depends on the respective national context” [20]. 
ICT also gives to the citizens the possibility to control and intervene in the political 
management of a country to some extent, social networks and online information have 
been converted in means to report unconformities or support government strategies. These 
are source of a heated discussion about the freedom speech and political control, an 
example of this was the decision in January 2011 to cut off the Internet access in Egypt 
with the goal of deterring political and social crisis and avoiding external intrusions. 
Essentially, commented Zhuo, Wellman & Yu, “The interaction of organized groups, 
networks, and social media was crystallized in the Egyptian revolt” [21]. Further instance 
is the authoritarian Chinese regimen, it restricts the Internet access, filtering content and 
monitoring online behaviour inside its territory through what were called reactive and 
proactive strategies by Kalathil & Boas [22].  
States must collaborate and cooperate with other countries and diverse organizations for 
prosecuting responsible of cybercrimes and to improve cyber security level. This is one of 
the biggest challenges that affront stakeholders due to attribution and jurisdictional issues. 
Furthermore, there are a variety of cybercrimes that do not exclusively affect companies 
but society in general. It is important to underline that legislation that contemplate 
cybercrimes or regulate cybercrime investigation and prosecution schemes has not 
advanced as fast as technology and communities do. Besides, international cooperation it 
also affected by internationals affairs of global impact (global warming, refugee crisis, 
fundamentalism) and independent foreign policies.  
Public participation is also essential; this paper argues, in line with Shane, that citizens 
have to be included in the development of NCSSs. But, on one hand, the awareness of 
risks and threats related to cyberspace is a common concern of all users and therefore they 
become first so-to-say gatekeepers, providing a “layer of protection” against threats in this 
domain. And on the other hand, even the concept of what cyber security represents by 
itself a challenge “if people have virtually no understanding of what they are being asked 
to do or to support” [16]. Countries that hope to have wider support have to manage 
citizen’s participation problem or the stakeholders’ involvement may not happen 
otherwise. Awareness campaigns and training could be promising tools to progress in this 
field. 
State budgets are normally limited or assigned according to their priorities and that could 
be far from improving cyber security capacities. Countries in some cases must attend first 
what is urgent and comply with the basic responsibilities of states: education, food, 
shelter, a decent health system for the population, etc. Questions on who should pay for 
what inevitable arise on every matter of national interest including cyber security that 
governments classify as a national security, but CI’s managers, vital services managers, 
and companies, which are mainly from private sector ask the same: how much is enough 
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to be invested in cyber security and who should run the risks. 
To protect national CIs is an important concern when states desire to improve cyber 
security at national level and stimulate economic growth. Friedman said that “Governance 
frameworks must be evaluated in terms of how they promote investment, how they alter 
incentives, and who will bear the expenses and risks” [23]. States could offer a wide range 
of benefits to the managers of CIs to incentivize the function of securing fundamental 
services. Among these are tax incentives, state loans and subsidies. Another option is to 
establish minimum cyber security standards by law. NATO has identified some states that 
support both approaches: incentives and mandates [8].  
The relationship between economy and Cyber security becomes narrower every day, states 
not only contemplate CIs, they also are aware of the small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SME) such as “Finance, wholesale and retail trade, transportation, much of 
manufacturing, and many service industries would slow to a crawl without computers.” 
[24]. Additional costs that are difficult to calculate are indirect cost, companies that have 
dependencies from connected to subsidiaries could be vulnerable through them and 
benefits of investing in their cyber security cannot be easily measured, as was expressed 
by Tyler Moore in 2010 “Systems often fail because the organizations that defend them do 
not bear the full costs of failure” [25]. Consequently, SMEs demand governmental support 
and should be part of the efforts to improve cyber security at national level as at all, their 
participation should be at different levels and as broad as possible depending on each state. 
Policy intervention allows seizing the capabilities of private sector, to assign 
responsibilities among the stakeholders, to reach a minimum cyber security level, to 
incentivise the productivity and consequently economic growth [8].  
Cybercrime’s cost is significant as some of the cybercrimes that steal money from 
consumers are: online identity theft, industrial espionage, critical infrastructure protection 
and botnets [25]. In 2015, Ponemon Institute 3 did a research about the cost of cybercrime, 
they found that in the United States the mean annualized cost for 58 benchmarked 
organizations is $15 million per year as a result of criminal activities related to the 
cyberspace and increase of 19% in relation with 2014. Germany has the second highest 
rate followed by Japan. The average cost that a company paid as a negative consequence 
of cybercrime around the world is $7.7 million. Nevertheless, “There are no standard 
methodologies for cost measurement, and study of the frequency of attacks is hindered by 
the reluctance of organizations to make public their experiences with security breaches.” 
[24]. 
All in all, the need to analyse each case arises, taking into account specific factors that 
influence it for developing a comprehensive NCSS that address all security concerns in 
cyberspace and preserve open information and communication networks [26]. 
2.3 National	Strategies	and	National	Cyber	Security	Strategies	
There are 196 countries formally recognised as states, 193 of them are ITU’s members and 
72 have a National Cyber Security Strategy - NCSS or similar document. According to 
NATO, there are 63 official cyber strategies and 54 are following ENISA. Europe is the 
continent where most countries have issued a formal NCSS cyber strategy: 22 out of 28.  
Countries such as Belgium, Canada, Estonia, Luxembourg, Austria, Russia, Afghanistan, 
Malaysia, Ghana, South Africa, Jamaica and Panama have developed and implemented 
                                                
3 “Dr. Larry Ponemon founded Ponemon Institute in 2002. Headquartered in Michigan, it is considered the pre-eminent research 
center dedicated to privacy, data protection and information security policy”. [Available at: http://www.ponemon.org/about-ponemon, 
viewed on 01 May 2016]. 
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their NCSS, some of them even released a second version or similar document, it is the 
case for instance of the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, and the United States of 
America. Luiijf and Besseling indicated that the states address similar threats but each 
decides to face them in a different way according to their needs, views and aims [3]. On 
the other hand, recurrent terms have been taken into consideration in the majority of the 
NCSS such as: Critical Infrastructure Protection, economic prosperity, National Security, 
cybercrime and awareness. In the CI field some governments decided to face the 
protection of CI in a separated strategic document as Canada’s case that broadcasted an 
Action Plan for Critical Infrastructures for 2014-2017, although CI’s protection is still tied 
to their NCSS due to the importance that its has to states; CIs control vital services to 
ensure the normal performance of society, CIs supply water, food and energy, run 
transportation, telecommunications, health systems and support the banking systems. 
Benoit Dupont showed similarities in the content of several national strategies: the desire 
for better protection of critical infrastructures, the need for national coordination 
mechanisms, partnerships with private stakeholders as vital assets and the importance of 
efficient international cooperation [27]. In the same line, Luiijf and Besseling showed 
connections among 19 NCSS as: to Protect Critical Infrastructure against cyber threats, the 
requirement for international cooperation, and concerns related to cybercrime. The authors 
also showed that states called for stakeholders from private sector and public sector to 
collaborate and cooperate with improving the safeness in cyberspace [3]. A certain 
tendency is noticed; states  their NCSS’s from a high perspective towards similar aims and 
take similar measures, although priorities and visions are different among them.  
To analyse if states still have the same similarities or these have changed during the last 
couple of years towards a new tendency would be the next logical step, but going further 
even if the states have similar final aims the particular factors of each countries make their 
policymakers take different ways to the same end, although it does not mean that they can 
not use a minimum set of transferable and adaptable guidelines, which would help into the 
development process towards a global objective “cyber security”.  
How to build an efficient and effective NCSS is a partially responded question. There are 
a number of approaches for developing Strategies that have been published by different 
authors. Gaps become evident in the concepts development as; no consensus exists about 
how strategy-making process should be accomplished in the public sector [28]. Mintzberg 
identified ten different schools, some of them are prescriptive and others are descriptive 
such as the entrepreneurial school, the cognitive school, the learning school and the 
environmental school [29]. More recently, other approaches have been used such as the 
planning school and National Strategies for a Sustainable Development (NSSD) that was 
presented as a mix between the formal planning school and the imperialism school, this 
focused on policy integration, implementation and learning [28]. Furthermore, one of the 
most popular, created by the private sector, is strategic management defined also as “the 
central integrative process that gives the organization a sense of direction and ensures a 
concerted effort to achieve strategic goals and objectives” [30].  
Discrepancies among NCSS have been detected due to diverse factors, citing Chabinsky: 
“no models are perfect for developing strategy, some are at least useful” [7]. There are not 
global solutions for helping countries to develop NCSSs that perfectly fit their particular 
political, economic, cultural, structural and social characteristics. This realisation calls for 
guidelines that can be matched according to countries needs and interests. The 
transferability aspect of this proposal would permit its use by different countries around 
the world.  
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As interdisciplinary research this work brings the PDCA (Plan-Do-Check-Act) cycle from 
strategic management domain, known as: the Deming or Shewhart cycle as a basis of the 
proposal guidelines, although the final phase of it is modified. This cycle demands to 
focus on the planning phase, which is considered as strength because it is applied 
exclusively to the development phase without considering the implementation process. In 
addition, a set of KPIs, initially defined by Kronz as “measures or metrics that evaluates 
performance with respect to some objective”[31], are proposed as an additional tool for 
measuring the development of NCSS.  
2.4 Existing	Frameworks	or	Practical	Guidelines	for	Developing	NCSS	
Institutions and organizations from private and public sectors have developed a 
multiplicity of guidelines and frameworks to help in the development of NCSS, a 
summary of these is presented in the Table 2. 
Table 2. Summary of Guidelines and Frameworks for the Development of NCSSs. 
Source Guideline / Frameworks 
NATO National Cyber Security Framework Manual [8]. 
UN - ITU National Cyber Security Strategy Guide [32]. 
OECD The Digital Security Risk Management for Economic and Social 
Prosperity by Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development [33]. 
ENISA National Cyber Security Strategies - Practical Guide on Development 
and Execution [34]. 
Evaluation Framework for National Cyber Security Strategies [35]. 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) published the National Cyber Security 
Framework Manual in 2012 to serve  “... as a guide to develop, improve or confirm 
national policies, laws and regulations, decision- making processes and other aspects 
relevant to national cyber security” [8]. Additionally, NATO with collaboration of an 
experts’ group and the University of Cambridge wrote the Tallinn Manual on the 
International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare [36] that even tough without focus on the 
development of NCSSs, contains vital concepts that states should consider when they are 
elaborating their NCSS, namely state sovereignty, state jurisdiction and state control in the 
cyberspace added to the traditional state responsibilities. In addition the ITU published the 
National Cyber Security Strategy Guide mentioning “issues that countries should consider 
when elaborating or reviewing national cyber security strategies” [32]. 
The European Union Agency for Network and Information Security - ENISA, they 
developed a guide that is aimed at Member State policy makers interested in managing the 
relevant cyber security processes within their country called: National Cyber Security 
Strategies - Practical Guide on Development and Execution [34]. Moreover, they created 
an Evaluation Framework for National Cyber Security Strategies [35]. 
One of the most recent documents is the Digital Security Risk Management for Economic 
and Social Prosperity by the OECD, which was released in 2015. It proposes guidance for 
a new generation of NCSSs with a focus on managing digital risks and improving the 
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economic and social growth related to the digital world. This document is crucial to the 
Colombian case, because its government formally launched Colombia’s candidacy for this 
organization in 2013 so the development of the next Cyber Security Policy in the country 
must be formulated in conformity with this. 
Furthermore, Colombia is a member of the Organisation of American States - OAS and as 
such bound to its guidelines. In 2004 the General Assembly approved the Resolution 
AG/RES. 2004 (XXXIV-0/04) or The Inter-American Integral Strategy to Combat Threats 
to Cyber Security, and in 2012, OAS members signed the Declaration on Strengthening 
Cyber-Security in the Americas.  
From the academic point of view Luiijf and Besseling made a good progress analysing and 
comparing 19 NCSSs and concluding with recommendations on what should be the 
sections of a NCSS. Nonetheless, they specified that these sections could be changed 
according to the intended audience and national customs [3]. Supplementary frameworks 
or guidelines created by private institutions are also available, it is Microsoft’s case that 
released the following document: “Developing a National Strategy for Cyber Security; 
Foundations for security, Growth and Innovation” [37]. 
Frameworks and guidelines are available and each state can follow them totally or 
partially according to their requirements and priorities. Each framework offers a specific 
focus; in the OECD’s case is economic although it considers other factors such as 
international cooperation and social benefits. The ITU’s guidelines concentrate on the 
choice of the right cyber risks and threats and involvement of all stakeholders. 
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3 Terminology	and	Conceptualisation	on	Cyber	Security	
This chapter presents the confusion arising from the lack of harmonised terminology in 
cyber security at national and international levels and describes the advantages of 
developing common cyber security terminology. It compares various cyber security 
definitions and analyses the data collected via an online questionnaire. The outcome is a 
theoretical contribution: a cyber security definition, that countries may consider in their 
NCSSs. 
It can be argued that the transnational cyberspace nature, the increasing of cyber incidents, 
the escalation of networks use, and the need for national and international agreements 
claim for a baseline of common definitions to be multilaterally agreed. Countries have 
expressed their intentions in developing common cyber security terms, such as The United 
States –US and The United Kingdom - UK that expressed their will to engage in cyber 
agreements with Russia and China. However, their doctrine addresses towards different 
cyber security challenges from those the US and UK are concerned with [38]. 
States cannot establish agreements when they do not agree or adhere to the same 
connotations of essential terms [39]. Moreover, in the First NCSS of the UK, the urge to 
develop international principles or ‘rules of the road’ for behaviour in cyberspace to 
reduce the risk of escalation and avoid misunderstandings was one of the priorities. 
Furthermore, a UN group of governmental experts in 2010 recommended elaborating 
common terms and definitions to General Assembly resolution 64/25. Some efforts to fill 
the gap were developed by the East West Institute in 2011, which published the “Russia–
US Bilateral on Cyber security: Critical Terminology Foundations” with the goal to open a 
dialogue between the stakeholders from both countries, to understand the position of each 
other and to set a consensus around the basic definitions of cyber and information security 
[40]. The second version added 20 new terms in 2014 [39].  
There are also a number cyber dictionaries created by diverse organisations as the National 
Initiative for Cyber Security Careers and Studies (NICSS)4, and the Compilation of 
Existing Cyber security and Information Security Related Definitions by the Open 
Technology Institute New America. Additional samples are: SANS5 and ISACA6, that 
seek to harmonize the terms on cyber security and cyberspace. 
The NCSSs are public and official documents in which the national understanding of 
cyber terms should be reflected. However, there are countries that have not included 
terminology on their own, such as Spain, Japan and Luxembourg [3].The global nature of 
cyberspace demands a worldwide cooperation. If states want a better understanding of 
cyberspace and to establish solid cooperation agreements in this field the first step would 
be a common baseline of definitions. It would allow an enhancement of the quality of 
international agreements and cyber diplomacy as well as to aid keeping the peace and 
creating stability in cyberspace [39].	
3.1 Proposal	Cyber	Security	Definition		
As a result of the analysis among several Cyber Security definitions that have been 
published in NCSSs, the experts’ opinions and considering the focal points, similitudes 
and variations, this research proposes the following definition with the aim to harmonise 
                                                
4For additional information look at: https://niccs.us-cert.gov/glossary, viewed on 01 May 2016. 
5For additional information look at: https://www.sans.org/about/, viewed on 01 May 2016. 
6For additional information look at: http://www.isaca.org/about-isaca/pages/default.aspx, viewed on 01 May 2016.	
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the cyber security concepts at national level. It is important to underline that states 
interests are established depending on each particular case and the application of this 
concept purports to enlarge cyber security goals towards diverse national vital assess 
(tangible and intangible) depending on their own priorities, vision and aims: 
Cyber security is the set of technical, legal, political, economic, 
educational, military and/or organisational measures, means and 
procedures, to protect the interest of the state and the people that conform 
it, in the cyberspace. 
The non-existence of a broadly acceptable definition that involves multiple dimensions of 
cyber security delays technological and scientific advances by the avoidance of utilising 
disciplines that could help to face cyber security challenges [41].  Currently, cyber security 
should be addressed considering a set of different disciplines, technological solutions 
alone do not work any more, the need for additional measures has been recognised, for 
instance; organisational measures in a company can reduce the number of cyber incidents 
related with human errors and consequently improve cyber security in a organisation. 
This work has identified three approaches for defining cyber security. The first, from the 
perspective of the information security properties known as classic bottom-up approach 
which seeks to protect confidentiality, integrity and availability of digital information, as 
in the case of Australia, Montenegro, Romania and Sweden in their NCSS. However, this 
approach could be considered weak because it cares for the protection of digital 
information, without considering additional measures and means essential to the cyber 
security field nowadays such as: political, economical, educational and organisational 
aspects and the protection against risks and threats in cyber space. 
The second is the upon-down approach, which is based on the protection against threats 
and risk related with the use of cyberspace, it is the case of Germany, Finland and 
Belgium. Although this approach considers one of the principal states’ concerns that is the 
protection in the cyberspace, it lacks due interdisciplinary considerations. The Colombian 
definition belongs to the later type however it adds a further element: to minimize the risks 
for citizens.   
A third type could be said to be a mixed approach between an bottom-up and upon-down, 
when states attempt to protect themselves against threats in cyberspace and to consider 
information security properties and additional factors, as in the case of The Netherlands 
[14], including prevention and resilience but focusing on ICTs, Turkey [42] has also 
developed a keen interest in the protection of information systems. This category is 
considered as one of the best, however, according to this research it appears that the 
definitions developed by various countries lack certain elements, states develop their 
meanings according to their vision of cyber security, and subsequently their aims and 
needs. 
Additionally, to respond to the growing cyberspace challenges governments have included 
new elements and disciplines to the understanding of the meaning of cyber security. 
Hungary incorporated, political, legal, economic, educational measures [43], The Czech 
Republic added organisational measures to protect public and private sectors as well as the 
general public [44], Austria followed a similar line, but focused on protecting key legal 
assets through constitutional means, although what defines a legal asset is not explicitly 
explained[45].  
Finally, broader understandings have been published by governments such as The United 
States who are interested in establishing norms for regulating international behaviour in 
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cyberspace, to protect intellectual propriety and online freedoms [46]; and also Japan, with 
the aim “to ensure a free, fair and secure cyberspace”[47]. Although there are clear 
differences among the national definitions of cyber security, there are also commons 
denominators; the following figure summarises and illustrates the findings: 
	
Figure 2. Synthesis of Cyber Security Definitions. 
3.1.1 Qualitative	Analysis	of	an	Online	Questionnaire		
An online questionnaire was distributed to 27 experts from 10 countries. The original 
instrument is in the Appendix I. The convenience group was selected because of the 
following criteria: to have at least a masters degree in cyber security or a related field, to 
have participated in the development of NCSSs, to have practical experience or to be a 
researcher in cyber security. These criteria respond to this research need of collecting 
information from experts who have knowledge in both fields the development of public 
policies and cyber security. The demographic data related to the questionnaire is shown in 
the Table 3: 
Table 3. Demographic Data. 
Country Occupation Age Group 
Colombia 
Big Data Analyst  
Between 26-35 
years 
PI Expert 
Head of Information Technology in a Bank  
Technology Analyst 
Cyber security Manager Consultant 
Cyber defence, Army´s officer  
Cyber defence, Colombian Air Force Officer 
System Engineer and a postgraduate student at the 
Andes University 
System Engineer with a Master in Information 
Security Between 36-45 
years Head of Cyber defence Unit, Colombian Air Force 
Dean of the master in cyber security and cyber 
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defence (ESDEGUE) 
Chief Information Security Officer  
Head of PONAL-CSIRT 
Academic More than 45 
years Head of Public security and Infrastructure -NMD CISO - Chief Information Security Officer 
Chile Advisor MoD Between 26-35 
years Estonia Government official Research Fellow 
Between 36-45 
years 
Indonesia Crypto agency in military strategic intelligent agency 
Hungry Research - Employee 
Turkey Senior Researcher 
The Netherlands Director of Research 
EU Specialist 
Finland 
Director of Research 
More than 45 
years 
Director of Research 
Brazil Chief of Joint Staff – Cyber defence Center 
The online questionnaire asked the experts’ preferred definition of cyber security. 
According to their answers the major trend was a 29.62%, involving not only 
technological aspects but also non-technological such as: training, awareness, policies, 
procedures and good practices. These are the most complete answers due to show a 
broader understanding of what cyber security should be. Moreover, 14.8% of the experts 
define cyber security as a capacity of protecting systems to avoid any damage and the 
11.11% as a condition, state or security level in cyberspace. However, the highest 
tendency with 33.3% of the answers was to avoid defining cyber security directly, this 
parameter matches with some countries’ positions in which threats and risks in cyberspace 
are addressed without giving a definition at all, a summary of answers is shown in Fig. 3: 
	
Figure 3. Summary of Experts Cyber Security Definitions. 
The aim of cyber security also varied among experts’ responses, although an strong 
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similarities were present; 74.04% expressed that to protect the interest of states, CI, 
technological assets, users, security systems and/or data should be cyber security’s 
objective. These answers show that cyber security is in charge of protecting more than 
digital assets but is necessary for keeping state’s interest as well. The former tendency to 
define cyber security based on information security properties represent the 14.81% of the 
answers and the 7.4% do not express directly what they want to achieve through cyber 
security. Fig. 4. 
	
Figure 4. Cyber Security's Aims. 
The experts’ opinion matches with the comparison made among cyber security definitions. 
There is a lack of clarity of what cyber security constitutes and what it should involve. 
Cyber security is strongly related with the protection of diverse technological and non-
technological assets and to secure national CI is the highest concern amongst the experts.  
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4 NCSS	Comparative	Analysis		
This chapter compares the similarities and differences between the NCSS of Japan, the 
Czech Republic, France, Iceland and the Slovak Republic. Then it presents an analysis of 
findings. The comparison is focused on exploring how the selected countries face cyber 
security challenges and also identifying different aspects linked to cyber security policies. 
Subsequently determining the guidelines for the development of NCSSs, KPIs and 
minimum NCSSs components. 
The strategies that were analysed belong to Japan, the Czech Republic, France, Iceland 
and the Slovak Republic. This selection was made according to the following 
considerations:  
• The issuer countries must have a consolidated NCSS or similar public documents and 
these should be available online. Due to the online information represented the main 
source of information for this work. Additionally, there are states, which do not 
elaborate a NCSS itself but released other public documents according to their 
organisational structure or divide it into different documents, these cases were avoided 
into this research with the aim to achieve an homogeneous information’s source;  
• The issuer countries are members of the OECD. In order to align this research with the 
current Colombian political interest to the guidelines proposed by this organisation;  
• The NCSSs selected for this research had to be published in 2015. In order to analyse 
the most up to date policies that have been developed. It brought into this work an 
outlook about how states address some of the latest cyber threats at national level; 
• The selection had to be varied, consisting of strategies from countries that have diverse 
backgrounds, languages, economies, customs, population and so on. This allowed a 
broader observation and the identification of global tendencies in the development of 
NCSSs. 
 
In the following sections there is a brief introduction to each country and a summary of the 
content of their NCSS. Then, a general comparison among the NCSSs including the 
similarities, key objectives, aims and vision that were presented by governments.  
4.1 Iceland		
Iceland is a Nordic nation with a population of less than 500.000, a parliamentary republic 
and one of the few states in the world that do not have standing armed forces since they 
gained sovereign control in 1918 [48]. Iceland is a NATO and UN member. The Icelandic 
National Cyber Security Strategy 2015 – 2026 addresses the government protection, 
economy, ordinary citizens and CI as a result of the growing cyber threats, with a vision of 
an “Internet culture that is sound, promotes human rights, protects the individual and 
respects freedom of action to support economic prosperity and development”[49]. It is 
focused on: an IT environment that has to be secure by design and private by design, 
computer-related education at all levels, strengthening security requirements on the market 
for software and related services, defence against cyber espionage, strengthening the legal 
framework, awareness rising, the infrastructure elements defence, the desire to have 
reliable systems and networks and to increase the collaboration with others countries and 
organisations. Furthermore, The Icelandic government set up for principal aims to reach 
their vision: capacity building, increased resilience, strengthened legislation and tackling 
cybercrime. 
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4.2 	France		
France is a semi-presidential republic, located in Western Europe with a population of 
more than 66 million in 2014. Currently, It is one of the most popular destinations for 
tourists in the world and is a European Union, and a UN Member. The French National 
Digital Security Strategy, released in 2015, is the second NCSS developed by French 
government. It establishes a set of policies against the following threats: Cyber attacks that 
target the state information system and CI, citizens and all kind of French business, 
cybercrime, cyber-malevolence acts and the loss of confidentiality, integrity or availability 
of essential information which can lead to “economic losses, industrial accidents, and 
losses of human lives or ecological catastrophes and disturbances in public order, capable 
of affecting the life of the entire nation [50]. 
The French NCSS has 5 principal aims: To ensure the defence of French fundamental 
interest in cyberspace, to protect digital lives of citizens and to combat cybercrime, to raise 
awareness training and education of digital security, to develop an environment favourable 
to research and innovation and make digital security a factor of competitiveness, and to 
lead with a voluntary European members states policies that promoting a safe, stable and 
open cyberspace. 
The French government is aware of the need to distribute responsibilities among the 
stakeholders and established three groups: The first is responsible for recommending and 
implementing technologies, products and services; the second is responsible for protecting 
the state against digital pirates and also to implement cyber security policies; and the third 
is in charge of using responsibly the services and technologies.  
4.3 The	Czech	Republic		
The Czech Republic is a central European country with a population of almost 11 million 
in 2015. It has a unitary parliamentary constitutional government. Its economy is based on 
the agriculture, industry and services (CIA7, 2015) and is NATO, EU and UN member. 
The Cyber Security Strategy of the Czech Republic 2015-2020 was released in 2015 with 
the aim to reduce cyber risks, mitigate threats and provide a secure, protected and resilient 
cyberspace. The Czech government considers organizational and technical measures to 
protect its systems and networks.  
The Czech government calls for an efficient cooperation at national and international 
levels that involves public sector, private sector, academia and citizens. It highlights the 
transnationality of the field. The principal threats that their NCSS mentions are: cyber 
attacks, cybercrime, cyber terrorism and cyber espionage. In addition, eight main goals 
were defined: The efficiency and enhancement of all relevant structures (CI and IIS) and 
their protection; an active international cooperation as well as with private sector; 
research, education and awareness raising; to support the development of capabilities 
towards to combat the cybercrime and to develop a cyber security legislation.  
4.4 Slovak	Republic		
Slovakia is a parliamentary representative democratic republic located in Central Europe 
with a population approximately of 5.4 million. It can be considered as a young country 
due to its separation from the Czech Republic in 1993. It is a NATO and EU member. In 
2015 the Slovak Republic launched the Cyber Security concept for 2015 -2020. It is a 
national policy with the following strategic goal: “to achieve an open, secure, and 
protected national cyberspace” [51]. The Slovak government perceive cyber security as a 
                                                
7 For further information look at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html, viewed on 01 May 2016. 
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key component of their national security and claims for the collaboration of public sector, 
private sector and academia as well as international organisations.  
The cyber security concept of Slovakia is focused on protecting national cyberspace, 
security awareness, to involve all stakeholders in the implementation of the national cyber 
security policy, effective collaboration at national and international level and to guarantee 
the protection of privacy, basic human rights and freedoms. The concept proposed by the 
Slovak government in cyber security area contains seven measures to adopt and solve 
based on; international cooperation, communication and technical measures, to implement 
a cyber security education system and research. 
4.5 Japan	
Japan is an island located in East Asia with a population of 127.3 million; it has a 
parliamentary government with a constitutional monarchy. Japan is the third largest 
economy in the world, in terms of GDP after the United States and China, with high 
technology manufacturing, automotive and pharmaceuticals industries that are the 
economical pillars. The Japanese government issued the Basic Act on Cyber Security in 
2014, that seeks to promote a cyber security policy; by establishing the basic principles of 
cyber security at national level, assigning responsibilities and roles among stakeholders, 
prescribing the cyber security concept, and determining the Cyber Strategic Headquarters 
as a command and control body of national security. In 2015 Japanese government 
launched its NCSS with the aim to ensure a free, fair and secure cyberspace, which 
addresses threats from the cyberspace use; from stealing personal, business and 
organizational information to threats against national safety and security through cyber 
attacks against CI.  
This NCSS established five principles; the assurance of information flow with a secure 
cyberspace available for everyone, prevalence of the rule of law as in all other domains, 
and autonomous governance, based on multi-stakeholders’ collaboration. Moreover, it 
describes in detail the four main goals and the direction of the Japanese policy: socio-
economic improvement, a safe secure society, national security, and stability of the 
international community. 
4.6 Comparison	Among	the	Selected	Countries	
The NCSSs of the analysed states are mainly focused on; their socio-economic prosperity, 
defence and security, and the development of a security culture within multi-stakeholders. 
A summary of the facts taking into account by these countries and the similarities among 
them are presented in the Table 4. 
Regarding cyber threats, these states have been found to have a long term vision and 
consider a big spectre of possible risks from the damage that a negligent service provider’s 
employee can cause by mixing his/her personal life and professional life could contribute 
to losses in the confidentiality, integrity and availability of essential information and 
furthermore even economical losses [50], to the probability of becoming a victim of cyber 
terrorism [50][44][47]. Furthermore, the countries do not consider only technical threats. 
For instance, France introduces a new concept the “Cyber-malevolence”, strongly linked 
to cybercrime and considered “ a digital aggression against people with results that are 
sometimes tragic” [50]. 
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Table 4. Comparison and Categorisation of NCSSs. 
  Official NCSS 
Key Elements of the NCSS Iceland French Slovak 
The 
Czech 
Republic 
Japan 
Cyber 
Threats  
Industrial espionage X X  X  
Cyber Terrorism   X  X X 
Cyber attacks X X X X X 
Cyber-malevolence  X    
The loss of CIA of the 
information  X X X  
Cybercrime X X X X X 
Stakehol
ders  
Government X X X X X 
Academia X X X X X 
Civil society X X X X X 
Private sector X X X X X 
International Community X X X X X 
Key 
action 
lines 
Awareness X X X X X 
Education X X X X X 
Training  X X X X 
Research and Innovation  X X X X 
Legislation X  X X X 
International Cooperation X X X X X 
National Cooperation X X X X X 
International 
Coordination  X X X X 
National Coordination   X X X 
International 
Collaboration X X X  X 
National Collaboration X X X  X 
To increase resilience X X X X X 
Minimum technical 
requirements  X X X X X 
Terminology (the need to 
develop a international 
term) 
X  X   
To protect CI, CII, IS or 
vital networks X X X X X 
Personal Data protection  X X  X X 
To protect Digital live  X    
Security by design X X X X X 
To protect basic human 
rights X  X X X 
Protection of privacy   X X X 
Protection of non CI, IS 
or vital networks X X  X X 
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Additionally, countries do not specify which kind of attacks they should defend from, 
because the possibilities are innumerable and in constant change. However, they identified 
the following categories of cyber threats: cyber espionage, cyber terrorism and 
cybercrime. The loss of confidentiality, integrity and availability of the information is just 
considered by three countries, but Japan and Iceland indirectly count them among their 
responsibilities. 
The global nature of cyberspace is more present than ever in the development of national 
policies; the need for collaboration, cooperation and coordination at all levels (national 
and international) is an imperative factor in the NCSSs analysed. Furthermore, all 
countries promote wide participation and involve different sectors: public and private, 
academia, citizens and the international community, although they are named and 
categorised in different ways depending on priorities, social distribution and policy 
implementation factors. For instance, France divides stakeholders into three different 
group as was explained in a previous section but call for a collaboration and cooperation in 
as much as possible. 
Cyber Security is considered an issue of national security, a vital component of national 
socio-economic development and essential for preserving national and international 
stability. Additionally, states know about the importance of CIs, CII, IS or vital networks 
but currently are also aware of risks and threats related with small and medium companies 
because are frequent targets of cyber attacks or victims of cybercrime.  
Supporting the same need for global measures, states call for diverse ways to work with 
multi-stakeholders not just in a cooperative way, they also are seek for collaboration with 
the exception of the NCSS of the Czech Republic. Coordination at national and 
international levels is also present in the NCSS of Slovakia, Czech Republic and Japan. 
An effective teamwork would support the countries in a vast range of areas, such as: 
political, organizational, legal, technical, and educational. It is considered essential to 
combat cybercrime and to keep international stability. France goes a step further in this 
field through the fifth objective: “Along with voluntary Member States, France will be the 
driving force behind European strategic autonomy. It will play an active role in the 
promotion of a safe, stable and open cyberspace”[50]. 
Academia and civil society are broadly named in the NCSSs revised. Academia as a 
source of knowledge and committed to a sustainable development; would lead countries 
towards ethical innovation and research in cyber security fields. Citizens are the final users 
who are members of a digital society as well. Closely related, awareness, training and 
education are some of the biggest challenges than countries mentions in their NCCSs with 
the exception of Iceland that does not tackle this aspect directly. States propose to 
incentivise awareness, to train specialized people with the required cyber security skills to 
be able to prevent, mitigate and react to cyber attacks. Furthermore, to established policies 
for educating people at different levels even developing an educational system active from 
primary school to postgraduate studies level. In addition, governments request companies 
to practice the concept of “Security by design”, which invites companies to consider cyber 
security issues from an early stage in the development of products and draw an emphasis 
on; new national services and products that should be safe from their conception and 
production. Another common point is the concern over data protection, excluding Slovakia 
that talks about privacy protection instead. A broader vision is presented by Japan, 
Slovakia, Czech Republic and Iceland on the protection of human rights if to compare 
theirs with the French strategy that is the only one of the five that seeks for protecting 
people’s digital lives.  
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The protection of CI, CII, IS, or vital networks is one of the main purposes of the NCSSs 
analysed. However, states recognise that they need more than technical measures to ensure 
protection for example; organizational, legal, and educational aspects should be also taken 
into account. Furthermore, states acknowledge that it is not enough to protect vital services 
and infrastructures; it is also essential to safeguard non-critical infrastructure and non-
critical information systems. Japan even demands the protection of the society in which 
the Internet of Things (IoT) system prevalence. 
4.7 Guidelines,	KPI	and	minimum	NCSS’s	Components	
This chapter explains the guidelines and KPIs for the development of NCSSs as well as 
minimum components that a national strategy should contain in the cyber security field. 
This outcome is based on the interdisciplinary literature review, document analysis, and 
the conclusions drawn from the analysis of the online questionnaire. The comparison 
developed in the previous chapter is also considered a trend to follow to the extent of the 
common denominators that were found and the innovative aspects that some of the NCSSs 
advanced.  
States expect to involve all stakeholders including international sectors into the 
development and implementation of NCSSs. Moreover, collaboration, cooperation and 
coordination are considered essential in cyber security field. Hence, this research proposes 
a hybrid approach for the NCSS development as a method to implicate the widest number 
of stakeholders possible. The proposal that that this work supports, brings up the positive 
factors related to the Bottom-Up and Top-Down approaches and mixes them with 
Deming’s management model. However, the last phase of the Deming’s model was 
changed in order to match with the proposal guidelines, because it is applied exclusively to 
the NCSS development and focused on reaching cyber threats addressed by the selected 
countries (Japan, Iceland, Czech Republic, France and Slovak). 
Governments normally lead the development of cyber security strategies at national level, 
but which organization is by itself a differentiator because states have different structural 
arrangements. For instance, in France the Prime Minister lead the cyber security policy 
with the support of the Information System Security Strategy Committee and under the 
supervision of the Secretary General for the Defence a National Security (CCDCOE, 
2015)8 whereas in the Czech Republic the National Security Authority - NSA has the 
overall responsibility for national cyber security supported by other subordinated 
organisations. (CCDCOE, 2015)9 The Icelandic National Cyber Security was developed 
under the leadership of the Minister of the Interior.  
As illustrated earlier, states have different organisations and work according to them. 
However, the most important factors are that the office in charge of the NCSS’s 
development has governmental support, enough knowledge in the Cyber Security field and 
related areas or has access to it, and the authority to congregate all stakeholders. This 
research applies all encompassing terms that can be adapted to any particular 
governmental structure in the development of NCSS, due to the guidelines for the 
development of NCSS were developed under the principles of transferability and 
adaptability. 
 
                                                
8 For additional information look at: https://ccdcoe.org/sites/default/files/multimedia/pdf/CS_organisation_FRANCE_032015.pdf, viewed on 01 May 2016.	
9 For additional information look at: https://ccdcoe.org/sites/default/files/multimedia/pdf/CS_organisation_CZE_032016.pdf, viewed on 
01 May 2016. 
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4.7.1 Qualitative	Analysis	of	an	Online	Questionnaire	
The online questionnaire asked the experts’ for stakeholders that should participate in the 
formulation of NCSSs. 88.8% of participants recognised that the public sector must 
participate in the development of NCSS and lead it process. The need to call private sector 
and academia is broadly accepted as well with 77.7% and 74% respectively. Finally, 
experts agree in a 55.5% that civil society should participate in the development of NCSS. 
Although the group of experts seem to be aware of the transnational nature of the cyber 
space, just 11.1% of them express that international organisations, international experts or 
other countries should be part of the NCSS’s development. Fig. 5. 
 
Figure 5. Stakeholders Who Should Participate in the Development of NCSSs. 
A multi-stakeholder collaboration for developing a solid NCSS was reiteratively advised 
by the group of experts; at least representatives from public and private sector, academia 
and civil society should receive the call to participate in this development. Moreover, they 
strongly underline that each country has a particular situation and it should be analysed for 
being able to choose stakeholders who would participate, as generalisations do not work. 
Although to follow countries with successful experiences brings useful information, 
policymakers have to be aware of the particularities of their country for measuring the 
correct level of participation and ownership.  
If there is any standard used to develop NCSSs, was asked to the group of experts; 51.8% 
of them agree that countries do not follow any special methodology, states normally go 
through an empirical process supporting mainly by national and international experts or 
agencies and allies countries with a successful experiences in cyber security area. 
Additionally, states should focus on the particular situation of their country due to the 
NCSS should be aligned with their legal, political, economic, military and social reality.  
Although 33.3% of the experts recognise that there are international standards for the 
development of NCSS (NATO, OEDC, ITU) and 14.81% responded with standards with 
do not specifically focused on NCSSs’ development, they agree that cyber strategies do 
not go into details regarding to any standards and in some cases it is the result of a 
political exercise, which constitutes a trouble due to the final NCSS sometimes differs of 
what the country really needs in addition the 51.85 % directly expressed that states do not 
follow any standards as is showed in the Fig. 6. At this point the need arises to help states 
in the development of their NCSS; through a set of guidelines; KPIs and minimum 
components; all of them with adaptable and transferable characteristics.   
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Figure 6. Existing Standards for the Development of NCSSs. 
Furthermore, this work found a set of problems and obstacles that countries face in the 
formulation of a cyber security strategy, 70.3 % of the experts’ group considers that 
contradictory interests among stakeholders and the lack of clear responsibilities and roles 
and their definition exists amongst them, this represents the most difficult issue to resolve 
during the development of NCSS. Followed by 51.8% of participants who think that 
economic limitations affect meaningfully this process. An additional concern is the lack of 
preparation and methodology or expertise present in the formulation process, sometimes it 
seems an untidy process and without a final objective. This obstacle could be solved 
through strong leadership by the agency or person in charge of developing a NCSS, which 
must be basis for guidelines as the proposal through this work and a continuous 
supervision of the process through an a KPI and additional measures. Fig. 7. 
	
Figure 7. Obstacles in the Formulation of NCSSs. 
Political will that may lead towards erroneous prioritisation is also a concern amongst the 
experts group, although it is difficult to analyse from the academic point of view, it is 
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highly recommendable to take into account a national risk assessment framework that 
states what the actual risks and threats in cyberspace are, while helping to resolve 
dilemmas such as the one posed by the difficulties balancing security vs. privacy. 
4.7.2 Guidelines	for	the	Development	of	NCSS	
The set of guidelines applicable to the development of NCSSs proposed in this work could 
be adapted to the particular situation of each country, and could be taught to suit to any 
state. It is composed by four phases; Plan, Do, Check and Legalise. Additionally, each 
phase is subdivided into several steps as is shown in fig. 8: 
	
Figure 8. Guidelines for the Development of NCSSs. 
The following elements were found to be common in the NCSSs of the selected countries 
(Japan, France, The Czech Republic, Iceland and Slovak) and the online questionnaire: 
• To enhance a multi-stakeholder cooperation, collaboration and coordination at national 
and international level; 
• To promote awareness, education and training in cyber security field. Moreover, to 
support the research and innovation; 
• To strengthen the legal framework; 
• To increase resilience against cyber attacks; 
• To protect CI, CII, IS or vital networks; 
• To include data protection (personal or organizational) and privacy considerations. 
 
This research proposes a mixed approach in order to involve a wider range of stakeholders 
and to diversify the gathered information techniques; it consists in tackling cyber security 
issues at national level considering diverse stakeholders and perspectives. The organ in 
charge of the NCSS’s development would lead the process as a coordinator; the aim is to 
know both perspectives and to avoid overlapping efforts. On one hand, there is a 
centralised national agency responsible for cyber security but the leader of the NCSS’s 
development with the national organisations related to cyber security. On the other hand, 
multi-stakeholders starting in low levels and going up. It would help to resolve one of the 
problems identified in the formulation of NCSS the lack of an accurate participation. Fig. 
9. 
35 
 
	
Figure 9. Mix Approach for the Development of NCSSs. 
The situation of each country is unique, so generalisations do not apply. Structures, states 
responsibilities distribution, national interests and performance of each state vary and 
could be studied to shape policies of real impact through conceptual evaluations, 
document analysis and interpretative analysis. According to the information gathered 
through this research, it presents a minimum set of stakeholders, the given names are 
considered generic and the selection was made based on the possible functions that these 
are responsible for. Table No. 5  
Table 5. Possible Stakeholders. 
Sector Possible Stakeholders 
Public Sector  ▪ National Planning Department 
▪ Ministry of Interior 
▪ Ministry of Justice 
▪ Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
▪ Ministry of National Defence 
▪ Ministry of Education  
▪ Ministry of Information Technology and Communications 
▪ Ministry of National Treasury 
▪ National CERT 
▪ Military Forces 
▪ Intelligence Services 
Private Sector ▪ CI’s managers 
▪ Small and Medium Enterprises 
▪ National unions and associations related to cyber security 
▪ Sectorial CERT – CSIRT 
Academia ▪ Universities 
▪ Think-tanks  
▪ Research centers  
Civil Society Organisations or institutions that represent citizens could be an 
option for guaranteeing their involving into the development of 
NCSS.  
Depending on the country, the Representatives from International Community may be 
considered in the development of NCSS. A government could request international advice 
from organisations such as OAS or the UN. It would translate in the strengthening of 
cross-boarding vision of cyber security.  
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An additional explanation with a summary of the proposal guidelines is in the table 6:  
Table 6. Guidelines for the Development of NCSSs. 
Phase Description 
1.1 To analyse the 
context at national 
and international 
level. 
▪Political will and National interest. 
▪Economic country situation. 
▪National security goals. 
▪International threats and concerns. 
▪ Society and culture of the country. 
To be aware of the context in which the NCSS will be 
developed and implemented. It seeks that the stakeholders 
particularise the development and adapt it into the national 
situation and interests. 
1.2 To investigate the 
current 
stakeholders roles 
and 
responsibilities. 
Who is in charge of want sometime differs to how it 
responsibilities are written down. Leaders of the 
development process have to be clear about the roles and 
obligations of each stakeholder prior to implementation; it 
applies a global vision about the current national situation in 
the cyber security field and related areas. Besides it is 
essential for choosing the stakeholders who will participate 
in the NCSS’s development.   
1.3 To analyse the 
previous NCSS. 
When previous NCSS or similar documents exist, it is vital 
to analyse their particular characteristics and the real impact 
of these for the country. 
▪Was the action plan accomplished totally or partially? 
▪What were the weaknesses and strengths of the previous 
NCSS? 
▪What lessons could be learned from the previous 
development process and implementation? 
1.4  To set the vision, 
scope and 
objectives 
It allows to keep the focus and to work collaboratively in 
order to achieve the same final aims. It is recommendable to 
set them up in common agreement with stakeholders. 
However, the relevant parts normally have quite diverse 
interest whereas the interest of the private sector ISP’s is 
very different from those of the intelligence interests and 
could become contradictory even inside of the public sector 
the military forces’ position normally is quite far from the 
priorities expressed by the ministers of technologic and 
economics. In addition, not all stakeholders have the same 
sense of urgency and therefore to prioritise the objectives 
represents a discussion that could end up in an unsatisfactory 
manner for some stakeholders. 
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2.1 To engage the 
correct 
stakeholders 
The digital domain comprises an abundance of parties and 
actors who have become increasingly connected to each 
other and dependent on each other. In order to be able to act 
safely in digital domain, which is characterised by a great 
dependence between the parties, it is important for citizens, 
organisations and government bodies to actively participate 
based on a clear allocation of roles and a great degree of 
transparency. Although, governments who identified their 
Critical Infrastructures can use this information to select the 
participants in the development, it process should be wider 
and include diverse social, economical and political sectors. 
2.2 To establish 
communication 
channels among the 
stakeholders 
Due to the number of stakeholders which should participate 
in the development of NCSS it is important to set up the 
manner, mechanism and means that stakeholders would use 
to communicate to each other, to express their views, points 
of view and needs.  
The information shared should be exclusively for the 
formulation process, and leaders of it (public sector) should 
guarantee the security of shared information and means 
using for this process. Additionally, non-disclosure 
agreements might be signed if needed. 
2.3  National Risk 
Assessment  
It technically allows identifying, analysing and evaluating 
the actual risks [34]. Moreover, it brings useful information 
for the objectives’ selection and prioritisation as well as to 
set the scope that would cover the strategy. 
2.4 To set up a 
working plan - with 
the stakeholders 
and develop it. 
It is important to set up rules under which stakeholders 
would work. To guarantee participation of all stakeholders 
and reach agreements in the points that they could disagree. 
A leadership of the organisation or office in charge of the 
NCSS’s development is also important for solving issues, to 
keep the track towards the aims and vision established in the 
previous steps and to ensure that the process is in continuous 
evolution. 
3.1 To write a draft of 
NCSS 
When the stakeholders reach minimum agreements, policy 
makers in a parallel process should convert them into a 
document that have to reflect clearly the work done. The 
document will be in constant change until a final approval is 
signed.  
3.2 To do a feedback 
of the work based 
on the NCSS draft. 
It is essential that the real work does not differ from the 
written policy, before the final approved the document the 
NCSS should be re-write a number of times until the 
majority of stakeholders are in agreement. Nevertheless, its 
process could be endless and the organisation or office in 
charge of leading the NCSS development have to take the 
final decision about which point its process should finish if 
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all the stakeholders do not fully agree. 
4.1 To write a final 
NCSS 
All the work has a final aim; to write a NCSS for a specific 
country, It has to be clear and according to the result gotten 
from the previous steps. 
4.2 To process the 
NCSS according to 
the law. 
Each state has a particular process to legalise their national 
strategies, after the developmental process ends, the final 
text should go through this process and become an official 
NCSS. 
4.7.3 Key	Performance	Indicators	
This work determines KPIs for the development of NCSSs, which are focused on 
determining success and quality in achieving the final strategic goal [31], which is to 
develop a NCSS with the particularities of each state. Additionally, the information gotten 
from the NCSS comparison and the proposal guidelines were taken into consideration to 
align them into a single process. These were taught as qualitative measures, and then these 
are not questions of past and fail but a better understanding of the formulation process to 
aid the success of new NCSS. In order to provide guidance to policymakers this work 
proposes tables to help them to identify if the KPIs are being accomplished or which are 
their actual state of development. It is important to underline that the proposal tables might 
be modified according to each state requirements then policymakers could add and/or 
subtract variables to fulfil their needs. 
1. To consider the context under which the NCSS will be developed. Refers to the 
economical, political, social, legal and military situation of each country. Furthermore, 
policymakers should consider previous policies, others national strategies and 
international agreements. Table 7. 
Table 7. KPI No 1. 
  Variable Yes No  Partially Why? % 
To analyze 
and 
consider 
how these 
factors 
affect the 
formulation 
of a NCSS 
Political requirements          
Economic resources available for 
policy development and 
implementation       
 
  
National security goals and 
threats        
 
  
International situation (Threats, 
concerns and agreements)       
 
  
Society (Culture and Customs)          
Legal demands and/or 
requirements       
   
 
Total:   
This work suggests 6 variables to measure the KPI No 1; each task has a maximum 
value of 16.67% as a result of dividing 100% among number of variables (6). However, 
policymakers might increase or decrease number of variables, in that case maximum 
value of each task would change. If a state does not totally fulfil a task, a minor value 
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has to be assigned (<16.67%). The calculated values of each task should be added to 
get the final KPI’s value; it should be assigned between 0 % and 100%.  
2. To establish the vision, objectives and scope in mutual agreement with the stakeholders 
and to set priorities and limitations considering the result of a national risk assessment 
and national interests. It brings objective factors into the development process and to 
focus on the actual reality of the country. Moreover, it purports that stakeholders work 
collaboratively to the same ends and to avoid working on topics that will not be 
considered in the NCSS of each country. Table 8. 
Table 8. KPI No 2. 
 Variable Yes Not Why? % 
To 
establish 
(For a 
specific 
time) 
Vision     
 Scope       
 Priorities       
 Aims       
 Limitations       
Have been the vision, 
scope, priorities, aims and 
limitations shared with 
stakeholders? 
  
 
 
Total:  
To calculate the KPI No 2 this research proposes 6 variables with a 16.67% of value for 
each one if the answer is yes, otherwise it would get 0%. These percentages may 
change if policymakers decide to add or subtract any variable, in this case were 
calculated in the following way: 100% divided into 6 (number of variables). The partial 
values have to be added to get the final measure. 
3. To involve the correct stakeholders into the development process from the beginning is 
one of the challenges that policymakers commonly face. Based on the comparison 
realized in the previous chapter countries are interested to direct their NCSS, towards a 
broad spectrum of stakeholders from public, private and international sectors as well as 
academia. Then, if the states want a major acceptance of their policies and to 
accomplish them effectively, states should achieve a higher degree of stakeholders’ 
participation and strategy “ownership” during the development process [20]. Table 9. 
This work suggests 22 stakeholders that should participate in the formulation of a 
NCSS. Nevertheless, the participants’ number could be changed by policymakers to 
fulfil state’s requirements; each representative gets 4.54% as a result of dividing 100% 
among number of stakeholders (22), if there is any office/organisation that does not 
have any representative it would get 0% but if there are more than one from the same 
office/organisation a 4.54% would be assigned. These values should be added to get the 
final result to the KPI No 3. Finally, to keep level of participation over to 75% is highly 
recommendable in order to guarantee that the stakeholders’ majority is involved in the 
NCSS’s formulation process. 
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Table 9. KPI No 3. 
		 Representatives from Yes No  Why? % 
Public Sector 
National Planning Department        
Ministry of Interior 		 		 	 		
Ministry of Justice 		 		 	 		
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 		 		 	 		
Ministry of National Defence 		 		 	 		
Ministry of Education 		 		 	 		
Ministry of Information Technology 
and Communications 		 		
	
		
Ministry of National Treasury 		 		 	 		
National CERT 		 		 	 		
Military Forces 		 		 	 		
Intelligence Services 		 		 	 		
Private Sector 
CI's managers 		 		 	 		
Small and Medium Enterprises 		 		 	 		
National unions and associations 
related to cyber security 		 		
	
		
Sectorial CERT and/or CSIRT 		 		 	 		
Academia 
Universities 		 		 	 		
Think-tanks  		 		 	 		
Research centers  		 		 	 		
Civil Society Organisations of community leaders 		 		
	 		
Citizens 		 		 	 		
International 
Community 
Organisations and/or Institutions  		 		 	 		
States  		 		 	 		
Total:	 	
4. To set up a working plan and develop it. According to the proposed guidelines this KPI 
measure the phases 2.2 and 2.4, which are about establishing communication channels 
and to develop a working plan with stakeholders. It seeks that the development process 
has a constant level of participation and evolves in perpetuity. Then stakeholders have 
to agree on a roadmap; normally they might establish a set of meetings for discussing 
grey areas and to expose their points of view. It is highly recommendable to keep track 
of the aims and visions set up previously and to use technology for efficient gathering 
information. Table 10. 
In order to calculate the KPI No 4, this research proposes 6 variables that can be 
adapted according to a specific NCSS’s formulation process. Each variable should be 
evaluated between 0 % and 16.67% but if the number of variables changes this range 
would change as well. Policymakers have to objectively evaluate the proposal variables 
in line with the work done. Finally, the total is calculated by adding all partial values.  
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Table 10. KPI No 4. 
 
Yes Not  Partially  Why? % 
To schedule meetings and/or workshops           
To assign specific tasks to be developed 
during meetings and/or workshops    
  
To do partial reports about developed 
activities    
  
To set communication channels          
To establish partial aims for being reached 
at specific time       
 
  
To keep stakeholders participation level as 
high as be possible through the process (at 
least 75% is recommendable) 
   
 
 
Total:   
5. To balance the different interests of the stakeholders. As a developmental process, 
which involves stakeholders from different backgrounds and interests to reach 
commons points is hard work. There are some dilemmas that have been identified by 
NATO in 2012 such as: Economy vs. National Security, modernisation or CI 
protection, data protection vs. information sharing, and Freedom of Expression vs. 
Political Stability [8]. These are a few examples of the discussions that would be part of 
this process, although a final decision is considered a political one. However, it is 
recommendable from the academic point of view that the vision, objectives, scope and 
limitations established during the previous phases would be considered for taking final 
decisions. Finally, prioritisation plays a vital role at this point, although the needs 
among countries could be similar, looking in a deeper way the priorities and resources 
are different.  
4.7.4 Minimum	Components	of	NCSSs	
This research also proposes the minimum components of a NCSS, and by minimum it is 
meant; a set of elements that should be part of a NCSS, these would allow that 
stakeholders at national and international level to know what exactly a government wants 
to achieve through their cyber strategy. It also would help to enhance the international 
cooperation and to avoid misunderstandings. Table 11. 
Table 11. Minimum Components of NCSSs. 
Component Description 
Foreword For establishing the importance and value of the NCSS.  
Introduction Introducing the NCSS, outlining the relevance and the most important 
aspects related within the strategy. 
Vision To explain what a state ideally wants to achieve long-term in cyber 
security area. 
Principles Explaining the foundation on which a strategy would be developed and 
the criteria for orienting the NCSS.   
Main Goals 
(aims) 
Explicitly, define what a state would accomplish, where all 
stakeholders efforts (and needs) would be set out too.  
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Action Plan It is the roadmap that would bring into reality the NCSS. These should 
be concrete and clear. It is highly recommended that assigned tasks 
have a single point of responsibility for development and a specific 
time for accomplishing them. These would be useful for measuring the 
NCSS’s implementation 
Depending on each nation the NCSS could add sections as the Japan’s case or take away 
others ones as in the case of France. Besides, it is important to underline that this proposal 
is about the minimal content of NCSSs, it is not referring to the organisation or sections of 
the strategy itself, due to this it is quite natural that national strategies may differ as a 
result of the diverse particular characteristics of each country [3]. 
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5 Colombian	Case	Study	
This chapter applies the guidelines proposed to the particular case of the Republic of 
Colombia, starting from the description of cyber security status in Colombia, followed by 
recommendations and limitations. This section relies mainly on offline documents and 
public information.  
5.1 Cyber	Security	in	Colombia		
The case study begins with the steps that correspond to the first phase of the Guidelines 
for Developing NCSS, named as PLAN, these are: to analyse the Colombian’s context 
under which the NCSS would be implemented (Phase 1.1); to investigate what are the 
current stakeholders’ roles and responsibilities (Phase 1.2); to analyse the earlier versions 
of the Colombian’s NCSS (Phase 1.3). Finally, to set a vision, scope and objectives 
(Phase 1.4). 
5.1.1 Factors	that	Affect	the	Development	of	a	Colombian	NCSS	–	Phase	1.1	
The Republic of Colombia is a Northern South American country with a population of 
more than 48 million, with a governmental system, which is based on a presidential 
participatory democratic republican framework. It is dependent on multiple agro-
manufacturing sectors with various industries such as: oil, agriculture, fisheries, industry, 
mining, services and energy. On the other hand, according to the Report on Cyber security 
and Critical Infrastructure in the Americas by the OAS: “The income of the Colombian 
ITC’s industry reached €14 billion euros in 2012, 6% of the GDP with an annual growth 
of 9%. The ITC industry created 110,000 direct jobs and it’s growing faster than others. 
The investment in the ITC sector reached €5.9 billion euros in 2013”[52]. It means the IT 
impact over the Colombian economy can be considered high.  
However, the governmental priorities seem to be far from the development of an adequate 
cyber security plan. It is explained that Colombia has been highly affected by the drop in 
oil prices, and since it represents a big percentage of the state incomes the budget does not 
allow investment in the ICT’s sector. Additionally, on September 2012, the Colombian 
government officially established a negotiation with one of the oldest guerrillas around the 
world known as FARC-EP, and it constitutes a state priority. The government assigns a 
big part of the national budget to support this process that should conclude according to 
official declarations in the present year and for futures requirements that would be the 
result of the final peace’s agreement. It is estimated that the cost of billons of dollars has 
derived in loss of opportunities and also reduced the capacity to advance in other areas of 
vital interest. The Colombian President established budget limitations to all governmental 
bodies in the begging of 2016 and a study for incrementing taxes is on the way. From the 
economical perspective the next Colombian’s NCSS should be issued under an austerity 
perspective. Then the aim’s prioritisation would play an important role.  
The outlook for Colombia is undergoing a transformation process. Some predictions 
should be considered: for the development of the NCSS: the state interest is to be member 
of the OECD, expressed from 2013, this organisation requires that Colombia satisfies a 
minimum of global standards in different areas including cyber security. Then, is highly 
likely that policymakers would follow the practical guidelines released by this 
organisation in 2015. It also important to underline that there are not global solutions for 
improving cyber security at national level. The OEDC talks about enhancing the social 
and economical benefits related with cyberspace. But even though this vision may be 
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aligned with Colombian policies, in practical terms its applicability presupposes a level of 
social and economic development that cannot be said to match the local circumstances. It 
is highly recommended that although the country follows a particular guideline, it should 
to be made to suit/adapt to the actual Colombian situation.  
5.1.2 CONPES-3701	and	Stakeholders’	Roles	–	Phase	1.2	and	Phase	1.3	
Some measures have been established to improve the level of cyber security in Colombia. 
Starting with the previous cyber security strategy known as CONPES-3701 is a document 
that was released in 2011 under the leadership of the National Planning Department, and 
contains the national guidelines for cyber security and cyber defence. Its chief objective is 
to “fortify the capability of the state to meet the threats that attack its security and defence 
in cyberspace” [18]. The national strategy took into consideration several factors 
discussed earlier and common to other countries: human resources, international 
cooperation and legal reforms but placed the initial emphasis on the development of the 
police and military capabilities [53].  
Following the policies determined by the CONPES-3701, some governmental 
organizations were established: an Inter-sectorial Commission in charge of formulating a 
national strategic vision in the cyber security and cyber defence areas; the Colombian 
Cyber Emergency Response Team (ColCERT) with the responsibilities of a national 
CERT; the Armed Forces Joint Cyber Command (CCOC) and the Police Cyber Center 
(CCP) mainly in charge of combating the cybercrime in Colombia.  In addition, the 
Colombian government assigned $16.428.444.328 Colombian pesos for the policy 
implementation. Fig. 10. 
	
Figure 10. Coordination Model Established by the CONPES-3701. 
These emerging institutions created by the CONPES-3701 are in place as new public 
sector stakeholders but there is lack of clarity as to who is responsible for what. The 
intersectoral commission does not have an active role; there is no register about the 
meetings, activities, recommendations or guidelines that they have developed during the 
last couple of years. The military CERT and the National CERT do not have enough 
resources for building capacities; there are fewer trained people than what is needed, the 
technological infrastructure is inadequate and resources are insufficient. From the private 
sector this analysis is more difficult to conduct. Although the Colombian NCSS ordered 
the CI’s identification, this process does not advanced. Currently there is only a generic 
list of which could be the Colombian CIs. Then, to extend the private participation to 
SMEs or non-CI is currently complicated for policymakers, but there are some factors, 
which would help to engage additional stakeholders such as: economic or social impact. 
From the academia, one of the most prestigious Colombian universities (Andes 
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University10) has constantly participated in cyber security activities at national level. 
However, it is necessary that the academic participation increases towards more 
universities due to Colombia has more 200 universities, it means that the level of academic 
participation in the formulation of the NCSS is low. To involve experts from different 
disciplines, research groups and think thanks, is also necessary. 
Colombian’ government is aware of the importance of International Cooperation as an 
instrument for enhancing cyber security at national level. Following the Report of the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations (30-JUN-2014), Colombia agreed with being part 
of the OAS General Assembly resolution AG/RES 2004 and the declaration known as: 
Strengthening Cyber-Security in the Americas in 2012. Moreover, the OAS created the 
Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (CICTE), which is responsible for 
supporting the development of cyber security capabilities inside the member states. 
Colombia in addition, joined the multilateral agreement with the World Economic Forum: 
“Partnership for Cyber-Resilience”. All these international commitments generate state 
responsibilities that have not been detailed. So far, these remain statements of good will on 
paper. 
Additionally, Colombia also has reached agreements with international companies and 
organizations that operate in the information and communication industry such as: 
Microsoft, which allows access to the Cybercrime Center; and the Anti-phishing Working 
Group, which gathers a global coalition of legal authorities, industry enterprises and 
Government entities for establishing efficient cyber incident alerts and response 
mechanisms. In 2013, Colombia formally applied for being member of the Budapest 
Convention on Cybercrime. 
Colombia’s citizens are often victims of cyber criminals. According to the OAS almost 
half of the phishing attacks in Latin America occur in Colombia and the most frequents 
cybercrimes are: phishing, electronic fraud, use of malicious code, computer hijacking, 
hacktivism, identity theft and cyber espionage [52]. The National Police reported an 
increase of almost 50% in the number of people arrested for cybercrimes or illegal 
activities related to cyberspace from 2011 till 2013 the increase still boosting during the 
last years. Even, some well-known cases as President Juan Manuel Santos’ personal e-
mail suffered an attack that consisted of hacking and identity theft. 
Regarding cybercrime the CCP has developed several strategies for decreasing the impact 
and amount of cybercrimes in Colombia. Nowadays it operates with tools, such as; Virtual 
Contact Point for reporting cybercrimes online, which is available 24/7; specialized 
laboratories (forensic informatics) and PROTECTIO software for parental control. An 
awareness campaign is in implementation; it is based on releasing cyber security 
guidelines and reports for cybercrime prevention. Furthermore, the CCP is the national 
contact point with EUROPOL and INTERPOL. According to the Colombian 
Superintendency of Industry and Trade, the legal framework to regulate activities in 
cyberspace and to combat cybercrime has 13 laws11 and 7 Decrees12.  
The Ministry of Information Technology and Communications – MINTIC worked on a 
Government Online strategy from 2010 till 2014 and currently is implemented a second 
version from 2015 till 2018. It is called “Life Digital Plan 2.0” with the aim to “give the 
country a technological leap by the massification of the Internet and the development of 
                                                
10 For further information look at: http://www.uniandes.edu.co/component/content/article/656-about-uniandes viewed on 01 May 2016. 
11 Law 527 of 1999, Law 599 of 2000, Law 679 de 2001, Law 962 of 2005, Law 1150 of 2007, Law 1266 of 2008, Law 1273 of 2009, 
Law 1341 of 2009, Law 1437 of 20011, Law 1480 of 2011, Law 1581 of 2012, Law 1623 of 2013, Law 1721 of 2014. 
12 Decree 2364 of 2012, Decree 2609 of 2012, Decree 2693 of 2012, Decree 1377 of 2013, Decree 1510 of 2013, Decree 1510 of 2013, 
Decree 333 of 2014.	
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the national digital ecosystem.”13 MINTIC has done an efficient job of enhancing the 
citizens’ access to Internet, as evidenced by the fact that connections have been triplicated 
during the last years.  
Following the Global Cyber security index & cyber-wellness Profile Report – GCI in 
2015, Colombia was classified in the Global Rank number 9 with an index of 0.588; the 
highest level was assigned to the United States with a value of 0.824. The GCI reflects the 
level of a state commitment in five areas: legal, technical, organizational efforts, capacity 
building and international cooperation but does not seek to determine the efficacy or 
success of a particular measure, rather the existence of national structures that promote 
cyber security [54]. Additionally, the GCI identified some aspects that might be improved 
in the country, for instances: Colombia doesn’t have any educational program for raising 
Cyber security awareness and the government doesn’t follow any international standard in 
cyber security. The educational and training component of the NCSS must be realised. 
Although Colombia’s government has worked in several aspects related to cyber security, 
there are many aspects that require an active intervention of the state. In 2014, OAS 
assessed Colombia’s government, with the objective to advance cyber policies at national 
level and to map the current status of the country in regard to cyber security. Although part 
of this analysis is confidential some of the results that were published are: To update the 
CONPES-3701 and modify the way of Colombia approach the cyber security from the 
strategy part; to distribute the responsibilities equitably among stakeholders principally 
from the public side; to generate cyber-capabilities in cyber security and cyber defence, 
and to improve the international cooperation [9]. 
Colombia has advanced in the cyber security field. Organizational capacity was improved 
at all levels and responsibilities were assigned to some stakeholders. The existence of 
national guidelines, CERTs in critical sectors, legal framework and projects developed by 
different ministers are the meaningful results of the modest National Policy in the field. 
However, the created organizations don’t have enough resources to do their job efficiently 
[9] The lack of trained people, enough resources and technological infrastructure; are the 
most critical factors that currently affect cyber security status in the country. One factor, 
which has been marked by several cyber security experts and organizations is the out-
dated National Cyber Security Policy as well as that there is no significant advance in the 
identification, classification and categorization of the Critical Infrastructure and their 
dependencies either. Working on the maturity level of the existing agencies should be a 
good way to start the improvement of their cyber security present condition. 
5.1.3 Vision,	Scope	and	Objectives	–	Phase	1.4	
To establish aims, scope and vision of a NCSS is considered as an intersectoral job and 
highly affected by the political will. This works proposes a set of aims applying the 
theoretical contributions developed in the chapters above that should be considered in the 
next Colombian NCSS. The scope and vision are not proposed by this research 
nonetheless according to the Colombian political organisation, these have to be applied till 
2019 that corresponds to the presidential period and it depends of external factors as 
economic resources and political will. 
Proposal aims according to internal priorities and national needs: 
• Strengthen the capacities of the institutions created by the CONPES 3701 at the 
national levels; 
                                                
13 For additional information look at: http://www.mintic.gov.co/portal/604/w3-article-1971.html, viewed on 01 May 2016. 
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• To reinforce the legal framework for combating cybercrimes; 
• Develop and implement a cyber security educational strategy; 
• Work on strategies to enhance national and international cooperation, collaboration and 
coordination; 
• Identify, prioritise and categorise the Colombian CIs. 
 
5.1.4 Colombian	Stakeholders	for	the	formulation	of	NCSS	–	Phase	2.1	
The stakeholders who could be called to participate in the development of a new 
Colombian NCSS are categorized in the Table 12 according to the developed guidelines 
and the comparison of the selected countries:   
Table 12. Colombian Stakeholders. 
Sector Possible Representatives 
Public Sector • National Planning Department; 
• Ministry of Interior; 
• Ministry of Justice; 
• Ministry of Foreign Affairs; 
• Ministry of National Defence (National CERT, CCOC, Armed 
Forces, Intelligence); 
• Ministry of Education; 
• Ministry of IT and Communications; 
• Ministry of National Treasury; 
• National Protection Unit (UNP) - Intelligence Services. 
Private Sector  To identify private stakeholders who should participate in the 
formulation of Colombian NCSS is a demanding work, due to the 
lack of information and a prior governmental identification. 
However, certain criteria could be considered for instance: in line 
with the National Statistics Department the Colombian ISP with 
major participation at national level are14:  
• Comunicacion Celular SA Comcel S.A; 
• Colombia Telecomunicaciones S.A E.S.P; 
• Colombia Movil S.A E.S.P; 
• UNE EPM Telecomunicaciones S.A E.S.P (DANE, 2015). 
Besides to consider companies as ECOPETROL.SA, which is an oil 
company that in 2014 it had the biggest operating income in 
Colombia with $57.454.644.360.000 Colombian Pesos, follows by 
TERPEL.SA with $12.709.766.540.000 Colombian Pesos. 
Additionally, the Colombian policymakers should consider 
organisations that represent SMEs. However, due to the large number 
of companies that are part of this group approximately 2.500.000 is 
recommendable to involve organisations that represent them, such as 
FENALCO15. 
                                                
14 For further information look at: http://www.dane.gov.co/index.php/eng/, view on 15 April 2016. 
15 For further information look at: http://www.fenalco.com.co, view on 15 May 2016. 
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Colombia has 8 CERTs registered in FIRST16 organisation, although 
3 of them represent governmental institutions that were taking in 
consideration above, others 5 represent different sectors, for instance: 
CSIRT OLIMPIA from Colpatria Group in representation of banking 
sector.  
Representatives 
from the 
Academia 
According to the Minister of Education the best Colombian 
universities in 2015 were17:  
• Universidad de los Andes; 
• Universidad Nacional de Colombia; 
• Colegio Mayor de Nuestra Señora del Rosario; 
• Universidad de la Sabana; 
• Universidad Eafit.  
These could be called to collaborate in addition to educative 
institutions, think tanks and research centers recognised for their 
interests in the cyber security area. 
Civil Society 
(Citizens) 
The Colombian population in 2016 is 48.680.62018, so is 
recommendable to select organisations and/or associations to do this 
role within the development of NCSS, it is the case of ACUI 
(Asociacion Colombiana de Usuarios de Internet / Colombian 
Association of Internet Users). To a major participation social leader 
can be considered.  
International 
Community 
The Colombian government have required an official collaboration of 
the OAS to improve the cyber security at national level. Furthermore, 
the OECD guidelines are considered into the development and 
implementation of national policies in order to fulfil the minimum 
requirements to Colombia for being part of it. To engage international 
non- governmental experts or organisations is recommendable. 
Although the CONPES-3701 ordered the CI identification, prioritisation and 
categorisation, after almost 5 years this process still in progress (OAS, 2014), it brings an 
additional complication about who should be call to collaborate in the new development of 
a NCSS at least from the private sector. Moreover, the national CERT do have the enough 
maturity and capacity to gather the principal private stakeholders [9].  A possible solution 
is to bring the companies that have a major representation taking into consideration the 
economical, social influence or geographic influence, direct dependencies on other 
infrastructures, etc. 
To sum up, to select the appropriate stakeholders represents some difficulty in the 
Colombian case, which can be accomplished only with access to official information and 
participation of different agencies. At this point records and existing information are 
considered confidential.  
 
 
                                                
16 For further information look at: https://www.first.org/members/map#CO, view on 15 May 2016. 
17 For further information look at: http://www.mineducacion.gov.co/cvn/1665/w3-article-351855.html,  view on 15 May 2016. 
18 For further information look at: http://www.dane.gov.co, view on 15 May 2016. 
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Additional Considerations: 
The Colombian stakeholders should establish a secure information channel among                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
them that can be use during the formulation of the NCSS (Phase 2.2). This research 
recommends that it could be in charge of the National CERT, because this institution is 
commonly responsible of leads collaborative activities at national level. Therefore, the 
ColCERT have means, protocols for multi-stakeholders activities and secure storage for 
gathering information through the development process.  
Currently, Colombia does not count with a National Risk Assessment  (Phase 2.3) that 
allows determining what risks and threats at national level are and how these could impact 
to the state. It is highly recommendable to develop this assessment for Colombia; it would 
help to stakeholders to improve the level of cyber security through more efficient 
measures and protocols based on actual threats and risks. Moreover, the result of it would 
help to select and prioritise aims as well as to establish the scope and limitations that 
would cover the NCSS. 
The organisations responsible to lead the development of NCSS in Colombia are: the 
National Planning Department; the Ministry of National Defence, and the Ministry of IT 
and Communications. They should propose a working plan to the formulation of the 
NCSS (Phase 2.4), it has to be shared with the stakeholders and adjusted according to the 
stakeholders’ requirements. It is also recommendable to considered the proposal 
guidelines and the KPI related with this phase (Figure 9. Mix Approach for the 
development of NCSS and Table 10. KPI No 4: Working Plan). 
5.2 Recommendations	in	Regard	to	the	Colombian	Case	
The development of NCSS is a process that requires the multi-stakeholders collaboration 
and cooperation. Hence, it is not appropriate to apply the entire proposal guidelines 
without the intervention of at least some of them. In spite of this, an approximate study 
suggests recommendations that could be included into the next NCSS of Colombia (Phase 
3.1 and 4.1), whose issue is anticipated in 2016:  
• The Intersectorial Commission is in charge of cyber security’ strategic vision, and also 
to establish political guidelines for the management of the technological infrastructure 
does not cover the responsibilities of a national cyber security agency or similar 
organisation. Currently in Colombia a centralized high national agency, to lead all 
issues related to cyber security is missing. This organisation would work as a national 
coordinator with enough authority and resources to supervise stakeholders, ensure 
budget distribution, lead national risk assessment, etc.; 
• In spite of earlier Colombian policy efforts to create a basic national structure, the 
maturity level of these organisations is low, mainly due to lack of resources (human, 
economic, facilities, and infrastructure). The ColCERT and CCOC have to focus on 
building capacity; resources should be assigned to these organisations but first of all the 
responsibilities and roles must be clearly defined, both agencies were created under the 
ministry of defence with overlapped functions. In the case of the CCP in charge of 
facing cybercrime at national level, the achievements have been better; they count with 
a considerable number of trained people, facilities and economic resources. However, 
the exponential growth of cybercrime and related matters, requires an increase of the 
state capacity to manage and operate; 
• Although the Colombian government argue that it has improved the legal framework 
about and related to cyber security, it the legislation does not fully connect with 
concrete cases. The country requires laws and regulations on data retention and should 
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also update the existing ones regarding the commercial use of digital information, CIs’ 
management, digital evidence, etc. The least costly solution could be the adaptation, 
amendment or review of the existing laws. In addition, public employees from the 
jurisdictional branch, prosecutors and court officials must be empowered with training 
and assign the means to support the whole system in an effective manner; 
• The identification, prioritisation and categorisation of the CI are urgent. It would allow 
concentrating all kind of efforts; economic, human, technical and organisational on 
what is really important; it also helps to prioritise resources and formulate assertive 
strategies. Then, protection of these vital infrastructures would be coordinated and 
systematic; 
• With help from other instances, at least with the participation of the Ministry of 
Education, the government should promote awareness, education and training in the 
area of cyber security. It may include interventions at different levels of education from 
the primary schools on basic skills of cyber security issues, and advanced awareness to 
postgraduate studies, together with specialized and continuous education programmes. 
Moreover, the ministry must associate with the different sectors to promote and support 
the research and innovation in this field. Incentives should be actually provided, rather 
than relying on issuing public policy documents alone. 
 
On April 11, a new NCSS of Colombia was released under the name CONPES 3850. It 
was available to the public and published online at end of April. Consequently, it is not 
included as document or reference in this research. The new NCSS of Colombia matches 
the recommendations of the present study; in particular, on the areas in which the country 
should improve and the suggestions listed above.  
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6 Conclusions	
Cyber security protects the lifestyle and general wellbeing in an interconnected age where 
virtually all information is processed by digital technologies. Not only businesses migrate 
to virtual environments, but also social interaction of all sorts and even the provision of 
public services such as in the case of e-governance. To face the transformative challenges 
that technology advancement imposes on society, governments have taken technical, 
economic, political and organisational steps, reflected in national strategies or similar 
documents. These are complex tools public policy tools that require expertise, resources 
and guidelines for their development and effective, rational implementation. 
The outcome of this study resulted on one hand, in a set of working tools with 
contributions of significance to theory and practice. The first achieved to advance the 
terminology in the field and presented as a solution to the first research question on 12 
guidelines divided into phases, that are adaptable and transferable. These established the 
considerations required to complete a systematic process of NCSS development. 
Additionally, and drawing from the information collected, a Key Performance Indicators 
self-assessment list was proposed in terms of 5 categories to affirm the benefits of 
measuring parameters, and a format for 6 essential components to be included in NCSSs 
could be put together. These last may strengthen cooperation if used to disseminate a 
common understanding in communications across instances as well. On the other hand, 
the partial application that could be performed on the basis of these theoretical 
perspectives, illustrates sufficiently the process, as it was required to address the second 
research question. However, the main limitations of the study also became apparent at this 
stage. Namely, the constraints that arose due to the lack of information that was classified 
then or does not exist, on areas that require precision such as the identification of critical 
infrastructures, risk and needs assessments that would only be possible if to consult all 
stakeholders could have been possible, etc. If proceeding without this last input (the 
stakeholders involvement or the collaboration factor), continuing the process would 
contradict the spirit of the guidelines.  
Nonetheless, the case study afforded practical suggestions that could improve the cyber 
security status of Colombia: The country needs to clarify who are the stakeholders and 
their roles and responsibilities; the government should focus on building capacity of the 
agencies created by the CONPES 3701; the legislator should reinforce and update the 
current legal framework; the Colombian CIs must be undoubtedly identified, categorised 
and prioritised; and, serious campaigns have to promote awareness, education and training 
in cyber security areas across curricula from the early primary school to the tertiary 
educational levels.  
Although generalisation does not work as a stand-alone solution for the development of 
NCSS the final objectives, threats and key actions lines can be grouped into general 
categories that follow accepted principles and common perspectives. All countries want to 
combat industrial cyber espionage; prevent cyber terrorism and cyber attacks; protect 
privacy and confidentiality, availability and integrity of information; and combat 
cybercrime. The means to achieve these objectives also shared an increase of awareness, 
education and training; creation and/or strengthening of legal frameworks; raising 
resilience of the services and network systems; protection of the CIs and vital networks, 
etc. Multi-stakeholders’ collaboration, cooperation and coordination are presented as key 
aspects for the consolidation of better cyber security activities at the global level. To reach 
a mutual understanding and consent on the terminology outside of the academic 
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environment is a demanding job of serious implications. Using the same language is not 
achieved with the issuing of a document. Working on the much desired common 
understanding of cyber security and related terms would in turn enhance the quality and 
transparency of cyber security agreements by stakeholders, it does not simply constitute 
and advance the theoretical grounding of concepts.  
The avenues for future research are promising: these concepts could be applied to more 
case studies or scenarios and collect data for analysis and verification on impact and 
efficiency, using mixed methods. National strategies have political, economic, social and 
organisational components that should be observed and scrutinized separately, so to count 
with more experts and study groups that could contribute to this line of research, which is 
needed too. 
The development of NCSS strategies is a multi-stakeholder process that involves national 
and international factors. Moreover, it is highly influenced by the will and interests of the 
participants, which are, understandably, diverse and may appear contradictory. Theses 
special characteristics cannot be captured and problematized in one academic paper only. 
Additionally, there is an unavoidable complication in research concerning public order and 
states’ security: crucial information cannot be disclosed to the public. This shortage of 
information applies to the development of NCSSs. In some Countries the documentation 
of such processes is disallowed, and when records are kept, only final texts are published. 
It is an inefficient state practice that studies must be conducted later on. The validation of 
this proposal requires time; to know the actual depth and breadth of impact of a NCSS 
implementation must begin. Some predictions could potentially be elaborated on, but this 
is a task for further research and a professional responsibility that will follow.  
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Appendix	
I. Online	Questionnaire	
§ How cyber security should be defined?   
§ Should a country design a cyber security strategy?   
§ Who should be called to participate in the formulation of a cyber security 
strategy for a country?  
§ What standards are used to develop national cyber security strategies?   
§ What evaluation methods can determine the effectiveness of a cyber security 
strategy, if any? 
§ What problems and obstacles could arise in the formulation of a cyber security 
strategy? 
§ What is your country of origin?  
§ What is your current occupation?  
§ What is your age group? 
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